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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS UNDER THE COMMERCE 
CLAUSE: CITY OF PHILADELPHIA V. NEW JERSEY 
Peter Flynn* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
New Jersey is confronted with a state-wide solid waste disposal 
problem of major proportions. The state's sanitary landfill sites 
have a limited useful life expectancy. The foreseeable exhaustion of 
existing landfill sites has focused the concern of government officials 
on the need for a comprehensive state solid waste control policy. 1 
In 1973, the New Jersey Legislature enacted controversial amend-
ments to the state's Waste Control Act (WCA). 2 These amendments 
• Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS 
I STATE OF NEW JERSEY COUNTY AND MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT STUDY COMMISSION, SOLID 
WASTE: A COORDINATED APPROACH (1972). 
2 1973 N.J. Laws ch. 363 §§ 1-2, amending 13 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 11-1-8 (West 1973). 
In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 97 S. Ct. 987 (1977), the constitutionality of the 1973 
amendments was at issue. Those amendments are as follows: 
Legislative findings. 
The Legislature finds and determines that since the enactment of P.L. 1973, ch. 39 (C. 
13:11-1 et seq.) the volume of solid and liquid waste continues to rapidly increase, that 
the treatment and disposal of these wastes continues to pose an even greater threat to the 
quality of the environment of New Jersey, that the available and appropriate landfill sites 
are being diminished, that the environment continues to be threatened by the treatment 
and disposal of waste which originated or was collected outside of the State, and that the 
public health, safety, and welfare require that the treatment and disposal within this 
State of all wastes generated outside of the State be prohibited. 
Bringing solid or liquid waste originating or collected outside State into State; exceptions; 
regulations; penalty. 
No person shall bring into this State any solid or liquid waste which originated or was 
collected outside the territorial limits of the State, except garbage to be fed to swine in 
the State of New Jersey, until the commissioner shall determine that such action can be 
permitted without endangering the public health, safety and welfare and has promulgated 
regulations permitting and regulating the treatment arid disposal of such waste in this 
State. Any person violating this provision shall be subject to the penalty and enforcement 
provisions of the "Waste Control Act" P.L. 1973, ch. 39. 
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forbid the importation to New Jersey of any solid or liquid waste 
until the Commissioner of Environmental Protection determines 
that such action does not endanger the public health, safety, and 
welfare.3 Regulations promulgated by the Department of Environ-
mental Protection (DEP) pursuant to the statute prohibit bringing 
into New Jersey municipal solid waste unless it is "to be separated 
or processed into usable secondary materials."4 The effect of the 
statute and regulations is to exclude all solid waste originating out-
side New Jersey from the state's landfill sites. 
The Hackensack Meadowlands Development Commission 
(HMDC) is a governmental agency authorized by the state legisla-
ture to provide the northern portion of the state with adequate solid 
waste facilities. 5 The projected useful life of the landfill facilities 
within the Hackensack Meadowlands District is of even shorter du-
ration than the expected life of facilities located throughout the 
remainder of the state.a Accordingly, the HMDC has also promul-
gated regulations which prohibit the disposal in the District of any 
solid waste which originates outside New Jersey.7 As a consequence, 
if the state were to repeal its prohibition on the importation of solid 
waste, the disposal of waste originating outside New Jersey would 
still be forbidden at landfill facilities within the District. 
The constitutionality of the aforementioned statute and regula-
tions has been challenged in two separate actions. In Hackensack 
Meadowlands Development Commission v. Municipal Sanitary 
Landfill Authority,8 the HMDC and the DEP sought to enjoin the 
Authority from accepting at its landfill any waste which originated 
outside New Jersey. The Authority responded by alleging that the 
3 13 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 11-10 (West 1973). If New Jersey is to avoid converting land into 
sanitary landfills, existing landfills must satisfy the demand for waste disposal facilities until 
such time as either the baling or resource recovery plants to be constructed are ready to begin 
operation. Concerned that existing facilities would be unable to meet demand for the neces-
sary length of time, the state has adopted measures designed to reduce the volume of waste 
arriving in New Jersey. 
, N.J.A.C. 7: 1-4.2 (1974). 
• Hackensack Meadowlands Reclamation and Development Act, 13 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17-
10 (West 1968). 
• Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68 N.J. 
451, 461, 348 A.2d 505, 510 (1975). 
7 N.J.A.C. 19: 7-1.1 (g) and (h) (1973). 
• 127 N.J. Super. 160, 316 A.2d 711 (1974). The Municipal Sanitary Landfill Authority 
owned landfill operations within the Hackensack Meadowlands District. Hackensack Mead-
owlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68 N.J. 451, 458 n.3, 348 A.2d 
505, 508 n.3 (1974). 
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WCA and relevant regulations of both the DEP and the HMDC 
violated the commerce clause of the United States Constitution.!! 
Similarly, in City of Philadelphia v. State,1O Philadelphia, together 
with several owners of landfills in New Jersey, sought a declaration 
that the WCA and relevant DEP regulations violated the commerce 
clause. The trial courts invalidated each of the provisions which 
restricted the importation of solid waste into New Jersey'" The 
State Supreme Court combined the two cases on appea1.'2 In a 
unanimous decision, that court reversed and held that the 
challenged statute and regulations were a constitutionally permissi-
ble exercise of state power.'3 
The case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court.'~ 
Before the Court heard oral argument, Congress enacted the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.'5 In a five-to-four 
per curiam opinion, the United States Supreme Court vacated the 
decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court and remanded the case 
"for reconsideration in the light of the Resource Conservation and 
Recovery Act of 1976."16 The Court reasoned that the Resource Con-
servation and Recovery Act may have preempted the challenged 
New Jersey statute, and noted that federal preemption of state 
statutes is primarily a matter of statutory interpretation. 17 There-
fore, "the views of the New Jersey Supreme Court on the question 
whether or to what extent the Resource Conservation and Recovery 
Act of 1976 pre-empts the New Jersey statute" were necessary. IS 
A dissenting opinion by Justice Powell found it "abundantly clear 
from the text of the statute and from its legislative history that 
Congress did not intend to pre-empt state laws such as the one at 
• u.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, stating in part: "The Congress shall have the power .... To 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States .... " 
"' Unreported 1974 opinion of the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division. 
II Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 127 N .• J. 
Super. 160, 168-75,316 A.2d 711, 715-19 (1974). 
12 Hackensack Meadowlands D~v. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68 N.J. 
451,348 A.2d 505 (1975). 
1:, [d. 
" City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 97 S. Ct. at 988. 
" Resource Recovery and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901 et seq. (1976). 
" 97 S. Ct. at 988. 
11 [d. The Court restricted its attention to the preemption of the state statute. Although 
the Court did not address the preemption of the state regulations, if Congress has in fact 
preempted control of solid waste disposal, both state regulations and statutes forbidding the 
importation of waste would be invalid. See text at note 25,·infra. 
" 97 S. Ct. at 988. 
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issue here."19 The dissenting Justices would have decided the case 
on its merits. 211 The majority, however, disposed ofthe case without 
reaching the constitutional issues raised under the commerce 
clause. 21 
This article will discuss the constitutional issues which are pre-
sented by City of Philadelphia. 22 If the New Jersey Supreme Court 
should decide that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
does not preempt the state statute at issue, then the constitutional 
questions would again be before the United States Supreme Court 
for consideration. Even if the New Jersey court should decide that 
the state statute has been preempted, the facts of this case are a 
good basis for discussing the constitutional analysis which should be 
used to review state environmental laws under the commerce clause. 
The article will suggest that commerce clause analysis is currently 
unsettled in certain areas and will propose a standard which will 
result in a less searching judicial inquiry. Finally, the facts pre-
sented in City of Philadelphia will be relied upon to illustrate the 
proper application of the proposed standard. 
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE LAWS 
UNDER THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
The commerce clause is an affirmative grant to Congress of the 
plenary power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations and 
among the states .... "23 Equally important, however, is the fact 
that the commerce clause also acts as a limitation on state power.24 
.. [d. (Powell, J., dissenting). 
211 [d. at 989. 
21 [d. at 988. 
22 The preemption issue will not be analyzed in this article. See generally Hirsch, Toward 
a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 ILL. L.F. 515; Note, Preemption as a Preferential 
Ground: A New Cannon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REv. 208 (1959). Other issues presented 
by City of Philadelphia not specifically discussed in this article are whether "solid and liquid 
waste, or the process of collecting, treating and disposing of same, is a legitimate subject of 
interstate commerce," and whether "an appellate court, in reversing order granting motion 
for summary judgment, can constitutionally decide case on its merits without offering moving 
parties opportunities to be heard, prior to a final determination, on material issues of fact 
raised by their complaint." 45 U.S.L.W. 3040 (1976). The New Jersey Supreme Court as-
sumed for purposes of its decision "that the service of transporting and disposing solid waste 
in the factual context here presented is in fact interstate commerce in the constitutional 
sense .... " 68 N.J. at 469-70, 348 A.2d at 514. A similar assumption is made for the purpose 
of this article. 
23 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
U Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946). See Note, State Environmental Protection 
Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1762 (1974) [hereinafter cited as 
State Environmental Protection]. 
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If Congress regulates a particular aspect of interstate commerce, 
any conflicting state regulation must yield to the superior federal 
enactment.25 Even in the absence of conflict, if there is a congres-
sional design to exclusively regulate a particular aspect of com-
merce,28 or if that aspect of commerce by its very nature requires 
that any regulation be national in scope,27 the commerce clause 
preempts state or local regulations of the subject area. 
The more interesting and difficult constitutional problems arise 
when the state and federal governments possess concurrent power 
to regulate commerce. If Congress has not precluded state regula-
tion of an area which is amenable to regulation on the state level, 
concurrent governmental authority exists. 28 The states may legislate 
with reference to legitimate matters of state concern as long as the 
national interest in free commercial intercourse is not unduly bur-
dened. A state law which unduly burdens interstate commerce must 
yield to the national interest protected by the commerce clause.29 
The judiciary must determine if and when a state statute contrav-
enes the commerce clause. Decisions of this sort require "a delicate 
adjustment of the conflicting state and federal claims. "30 The extent 
to which the national interest in the free flow of commerce prohibits 
state enactments affecting interstate commerce has received consid-
erable attention from the United State Supreme Court. An analysis 
of the Court's decisions reveals the development and application of 
a review process focusing on three areas of concern. The Court re-
quires: that the purpose advanced by the exercise of state power be 
legitimate, that the means for obtaining that purpose be reasonable, 
and that the interest promoted by the state enactment outweigh 
2> Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-43 (1963); Gibbons v. 
Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 209-10 (1824). Federal and state regulation will be deemed to 
conflict if "compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility for 
one engaged in interstate commerce." 373 U.S. at 142-43. But see Hirsch, Toward a New Viell' 
of Federal Preemption, 1972 ILL. L. F. 515, 526-28. 
2ft "An explicit declaration of congressional design to displace state regulation" preempts 
any state or local regulation of a particular aspect of commerce. Florida Lime & Avocado 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963). 
27 [d. at 143; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318-19 (1851). In Wabash, 
St. Louis and Pac. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886), for example, the Court held that 
the rates charged by railroads operating in interstate commerce are aspects of commerce 
which require that any regulation be national in scope. 
" 373 U.S. at 143. See Note, State Environmental Protection, supra note 24, at 1772 . 
.. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
34' H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525, 553 (1949) (Black, J., dissenting), cited in 
majority opinion, Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371 (1976). 
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the national interest in a free interstate commerce.3t 
The first element involves an examination of the state law to 
ensure that it advances a purpose or objective which is a proper 
subject of state concern.32 The basis of the analysis was discussed 
by the Supreme Court in South Carolina State Highway Depart-
ment v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc. 33 
[I]t has been recognized that there are matters of local concern, the 
regulation of which unavoidably involves some regulation of interstate 
commerce but which, because of their local character and their number 
and diversity, may never be fully dealt with by Congress. Notwithstand-
ing the commerce clause, such regulation in the absence of congressional 
action has for the most part been left to the states .... 34 
Barnwell rejected a constitutional challenge to a state statute which 
limited the width and weight of trucks traveling on the state's high-
ways. The challenging party alleged that the statute imposed an 
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce. In order to resolve 
this controversy, the Court first identified the purpose of the chal-
lenged statute as the "safety and conservation" of the state's high-
ways.35 The opinion states that "[f]ew subjects of state regulation 
are so peculiarly of local concern as is the use of state highways."38 
Thus, the state legislative power had been directed towards a legiti-
mate purpose, and the first phase of the constitutional review pro-
cess was satisfied. 
The second phase of the review process requires a means analysis. 
In Barnwell, the Court referred to this aspect of the constitutional 
review as a determination of "whether the means of regulation cho-
sen are reasonably adapted to the end sought."37 The Court inquires 
whether it is reasonable to believe that a particular enactment will 
31 See D. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: FEDERAL AND STATE 283-89 (1974); Note, Use 
of the Commerce Clause to Invalidate Anti-Phosphate Legislation: Will It Wash? Soap and 
Detergent Association v. Chicago, 45 COLO. L. REv. 487 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Use of 
the Commerce Clause). 
3. South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190 (1938). 
33 303 U.S. 177 (1938) . 
.. Id. at 185. 
33 Id. at 187. In many instances, a statute may have more than one purpose. For example, 
in Barnwell, the safety and conservation of the state's highways was one purpose. An alternate 
purpose may have been bolstering the domestic trucking industry at the expense of foreign 
trucking companies. Thus, by identifying safety and highway conservation as the statutory 
purpose, the Court was actually identifying the primary statutory purpose. See text at notes 
61-66, infra. 
341 303 U.S. at 187. 
37 Id. at 190. 
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actually further the legitimate state purpose. A rational basis test 
is employed to determine the reasonableness of the means chosen 
by either the legislature or the executive agency.3S The courts pre-
sume the constitutionality of the challenged provision,:19 and the 
challenger must demonstrate that the enactment at issue totally 
lacks a rational basis. 40 
The state need not adopt the least restrictive means for furthering 
a legitimate state interest.41 As explained in Barnwell, a court 
should not 
determine what, in its judgment, is the most suitable restriction to be 
applied of those that are possible, or to choose that one which in its 
opinion is best adapted to all the diverse interests affected.42 
Considerable discretion is accorded the state with reference to the 
formulation of state policy. Any means which is rationally related 
to a legitimate state purpose will survive the second phase of the 
constitutional review process. 43 
The third phase of the constitutional review process consists of a 
balancing test. 44 The Supreme Court has described this element as 
"a determination of the relative weights of state and national 
interest. . . . "45 The state interest promoted by the challenged law 
3M [d. at 191-92. 
38 Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529 (1959) . 
•• 303 U.S. at 191-92. 
" [d. at 190-91; ENGDAHL, supra note 31, at 285-86. In Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 
349 (1951), the Court invalidated the municipal ordinances at issue for discriminating against 
interstate commerce while "reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives" were available. [d. 
at 354. However, the Court did not say that the city was compelled to select the least 
restrictive means. In Dean Milk, the means chosen by the Legislature satisfied the rational 
basis means analysis, but was ruled unconstitutional in the balancing of interests test, the 
third phase of the Court's analysis. The decision reveals that the existence of an alternative 
and less burdensome means to accomplish the state objective is one factor to be taken into 
consideration in the application of the balancing test. As the Court stated, "Our issue then 
is whether the discrimination inherent in the Madison ordinance can be justified in view of 
the character of the local interests and the available methods of protecting them." [d. Due 
to the existence of a reasonable alternative means, the Court resolved its balancing in favor 
of the challenging party. See text at notes 50-53, infra. See also note 88, infra . 
.. 303 U.S. at 190 . 
• 3 [d. 
" Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 371-72 (1976); Southern Pac. Co. v. 
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783 (1945) . 
•• Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783 (1945). This balancing process is em-
ployed to review state laws which discriminate against interstate commerce as well as state 
laws which apply equally to intrastate and interstate commerce, but which unduly interfere 
with interstate commerce. Compare Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) 
and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) with Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 
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is weighed against the national interest in the free flow of commerce. 
If the state interest is greater, the challenged state provision will be 
sustained as a permissible exercise of state power; if the national 
interest is greater, the state provision will be struck down as a viola-
tion of the commerce clause. 
Although the courts conduct a balancing test, they use a scale 
which does not always start from a position of complete equilibrium. 
The national interest is significantly strengthened in particular fact 
situations. For example, a disruption of commerce which results 
from the lack of uniformity among various states' laws produces a 
judicial bias in favor of the national interest. This principle is illus-
trated by Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines. 48 At issue in Bibb was an 
Illinois statute which required that all trucks be equipped with a 
specified type of fender mudguard. At least one other state forbade 
the use of the type of mudguard required by Illinois.47 In holding 
that the Illinois statute placed "an unconstitutional burden on in-
terstate commerce," the Court did not simply balance the interests 
involved.48 Rather, the Court required that the state show a 
"compelling interest" in order for the statute to be sustained.49 
Therefore, a lack of uniformity among states' laws which produces 
a serious obstruction to interstate commerce accords an appreciable 
advantage to the federal interest in the balancing process. 
The existence of an alternative and less burdensome means for 
furthering the state objective also produces a judicial bias in favor 
of the national interest. 50 In Dean Milk Co. v.Madison, a city ordi-
nance which prohibited the sale of all milk not pasteurized and 
bottled within a certain radius of the city was challenged.51 The 
Court invalidated the Madison ordinance for placing an impermissi-
ble burden on interstate commerce as the ordinance created a trade 
barrier excluding interstate commerce. The existence of "reasonable 
nondiscriminatory alternatives, adequate to conserve legitimate 
local interests" was responsible for tipping the balance in favor of 
the federal interest. 52 Ostensibly, the failure of the state to adopt an 
u.s. 520 (1959) and Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) . 
•• 359 U.S. 520 (1959). 
" [d. at 523 . 
.. [d. at 529 . 
.. [d. at 529-30. 
51 Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) . 
.. [d. 
52 [d. at 354. A state or local enactment which discriminates against interstate commerce 
is not necessarily prohibited by the commerce clause. In Dean Milk, the Court inquired 
-- -------------
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adequate and less obstructive means for achieving a legitimate state 
purpose will significantly favor the national interest in the balanc-
ing process.53 
In summary, the constitutionality of state laws under the com-
merce clause depends upon three areas of concern. The court first 
assesses the legitimacy of the state's purpose. Second, the court 
examines the means chosen by the political authorities to determine 
whether that means reasonably furthers the legitimate state inter-
est. Finally, the court balances the state's interest against the na-
tional interest in an unobstructed interstate commerce. Within the 
context of particular fact situations, however, the balancing process 
may involve a judicial bias in favor of the national interest. 
III. ApPLICATION OF THE STANDARD TO THE NEW JERSEY STATUTE 
A. The Legitimacy of the State Purpose 
As long as the state regulation of solid waste disposal has not been 
preempted by the federal government, the statute at issue in City 
of Philadelphia must be examined in accordance with the three 
areas of judicial concern. The first inquiry concerns the legitimacy 
of the state purpose. 
The United States Supreme Court has established that states 
may enact laws for the purpose of protecting or promoting the 
health, safety, welfare, or morals of its citizens.54 The exercise of 
state authority for these purposes is sometimes referred to as the 
states' police powers. 55 The question raised in City of Philadelphia 
is whether protection of the environment is within the state's police 
power. 
The Supreme Court addressed the legitimacy of environmental 
"whether the discrimination inherent in the Madison ordinance can be justified in view of 
the charcter of local interests and the available methods of protecting them." [d. Only after 
balancing the respective national and local interests did the Court conclude that the Madison 
city ordinance was unconstitutional. The balancing test revealed that the ordinance was "not 
essential for the protection of local health interests" and therefore did not justify "placing a 
discriminatory burden on interstate commerce." [d. at 356. 
" Although it is appropriate to inquire as to the existence of alternative and less burden-
some means as part of the balancing test, it is inappropriate to require a state to adopt the 
least restrictive means for furthering its purpose. See note 88, infra . 
.. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960); Southern Pac. Co. v. 
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766 (1945); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1904) (discredited 
on other grounds). 
55 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1904) (discredited on other grounds). See also 
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). 
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protection as a state purpose in Huron Portland Cement Co. v. 
Detroit. 58 A city ordinance regulating smokestack emissions was 
challenged as a violation of the commerce clause. The Court noted 
the close nexus between the purpose of environmental protection 
and the traditional police power objectives of health and welfare. 
The majority found that "[T]he sole aim of the Detroit ordinance 
[was] the elimination of air pollution to protect the health and 
enhance the cleanliness ofthe local community."57 The Court there-
fore concluded that city or state environmental regulation aimed at 
improving the quality of the air "clearly falls within the exercise of 
even the most traditional concept of what is compendiously known 
as the police power. "58 
Perhaps a more convincing declaration of the propriety of state 
efforts to protect the environment was announced in a case not 
involving the commerce clause. In Georgia v. Tennessee Copper 
Co. 59 the state of Georgia sought injunctive relief against a foreign 
industry which was polluting the air blowing into Georgia. Discuss-
ing the propriety of Georgia's concern for the protection of its envi-
ronment, the Court stated that: 
the State has an interest independent of and behind the titles of its 
citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain. It has the last word 
as to whether its mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its 
inhabitants shall breathe pure air.60 
Thus, protection of the environment presents a legitimate state pur-
pose. 
A state may not discriminate against interstate commerce for the 
purpose of bolstering local industry. The Court has consistently 
struck down protective measures designed to burden interstate com-
petition to the advantage of local business interests,61 Even if the 
statute challenged in City of Philadelphia promotes the protection 
of the environment as one purpose, a second purpose may be the 
insulation of domestic industry from foreign competition. The en-
actment may have both a legitimate and an illegitimate purpose. 
51 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960). 
57 [d. at 445. 
50 [d. at 442. 
51 206 U.S. 230 (1907) . 
• 0 [d. at 237. 
II See Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976); Pike v. Bruce Church, 
Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). 
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The effect these dual purposes would have on the constitutionality 
of the challenged provisions must be examined. 
Resolution of this issue is facilitated by a discussion of the Court's 
decision in Buck v. Kuykendall. 82 The plaintiff desired to operate a 
common carrier for hire from Portland, Oregon to Seattle, Washing-
ton. The defendant argued that he acted pursuant to a state statute 
which authorized him to exclude "unnecessary competing carriers" 
from the highways to promote "the safety and convenience of the 
public. . . . "83 The plaintiff, on the other hand, contended that the 
statute impermissibly prohibited competition in interstate com-
merce to the benefit of those carriers already operating within the 
state. Thus, the defendant argued that the statute advanced the 
legitimate purpose of safety, while the plaintiff argued that the 
statute instead advanced the impermissible purpose of restricting 
interstate commerce to the advantage of domestic economic inter-
ests. 
The Court found that the statute's "primary purpose [was] not 
regulation with a view to safety or to conservation of the highways, 
but the prohibiton of competition."84 Anti-competitive restriction of 
interstate commerce constitutes an illegitimate state purpose. The 
statute was therefore ruled repugnant to the commerce clause.85 
Buck v. Kuykendall demonstrates that while a given statute may 
arguably promote more than one legislative purpose, the identifica-
tion of the primary purpose is essential in constitutional adjudica-
tion under the commerce clause.88 Therefore, in City of Philadel-
phia, a determination of the primary purpose of the challenged 
statute is necessary. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court found the primary purpose to be 
the protection of the environment.87 The evidence supports that 
12 Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) . 
.. [d. at 314-15 . 
.. [d . 
.. [d. at 316 . 
.. Compare H.P. Hood & Sons v. DuMond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949), with Milk Control Bd. 
v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346 (1939). Both cases involved state regulation which 
burdened the interstate shipment of milk. The Court determined that the primary purpose 
of the statute at issue in Milk Control Rd. was "to reach a domestic situation in the interest 
of the welfare of the producers and consumers of milk in Pennsylvania." 306 U.S. at 352-53. 
Therefore, the statute was found constitutional. In H.P. Hood & Sons the Court determined 
that the primary purpose ofthe New York law was "the promotion of the state's own economic 
advantages by curtailment of interstate commerce. . ." and the law was held to be unconsti-
tutional. 336 U.S. at 532. 
17 Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68 N. J. 
451, 464-65, 348 A.2d 505, 511-12 (1975). 
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conclusion. Restricting the importation of solid waste reduces the 
volume of waste buried at New Jersey's sanitary landfill sites. The 
reduced volume of waste produces a corresponding increase in the 
expected life of existing landfill facilities. 8M New Jersey contends 
that the prolongation of the life of existing landfills would, at least 
temporarily, eliminate the need for developing additional landfill 
sites thereby conserving presently undeveloped land. 8D 
Arguably the real purpose of the challenged restriction on the 
importation of solid waste may be the promotion of local business 
interests at the expense of foreign businesses. However, in the fact 
situation presented, the New Jersey statute does not advance that 
impermissible purpose. Local business interests would not benefit 
from the exclusion of waste. To the contrary, private landfill owners 
in New Jersey, such as the petitioner Municipal Sanitary Landfill 
Authority, and domestic disposal companies which haul waste to 
New Jersey landfill sites from surrounding states, would suffer re-
duced business. 
Considering all the relevant facts, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
correctly concluded that the primary purpose ofthe challenged stat-
ute is the protection of the environment. As environmental protec-
tion is a legitimate state purpose, the state enactment at issue satis-
fies the first phase of the constitutional review process. 
B. Analysis of the Means 
The second area of judicial concern is whether the means chosen 
by the state is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.70 
Unless the challenging party demonstrates that the means totally 
lacks a rational basis, the means analysis will not defeat the law's 
consti tutionality .71 
The New Jersey Supreme Court concluded that the restriction on 
the importation of solid waste constituted a reasonable means of 
furthering the legitimate state purpose of environmental protec-
tion.The court determined that it was not irrational for the state 
to find that the disputed statute would help to preserve currently 
1M [d. at 461, 348 A.2d at 510 . 
.. [d. at 465, 348 A.2d at 512. 
71 South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 330 U.S. 177, 190 (1938). 
71 [d. at 191-92. The means test does not present a serious obstacle to a finding of constitu-
tionality. This phase of the analysis merely ensures that a state law bears some logical 
relation to the purpose which the legislature has intended. 
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undeveloped land.72 Accordingly, the state supreme court reversed73 
the decision of the superior court which had held the challenged 
enactment unconstitutional for employing a means which imper-
missibly discriminated against interstate commerce.74 
In arriving at its decision, the superior court apparently applied 
a balancing test under the guise of a means analysis. The court 
weighed the burden which the importation restrictions placed on 
interstate commerce and found it to be excessive.75 The means em-
ployed by the state was therefore ruled constitutionally impermissi-
ble.76 The court improperly consIdered the burden placed on com-
merce as part of its means analysis. The only issue to be considered 
in the second phase of the review process is whether the state has 
chosen a means rationally related to the legitimate state purposeY 
Any consequential burden placed on commerce is irrelevant to the 
resolution of this issue. The disruption of commerce constitutes an 
element of the balancing test which comprises the third area for 
judicial concern.78 Thus, the decision of the superior court that the 
means selected by the state is constitutionally impermissible was 
erroneous. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court correctly concluded that the re-
strictions on the importation of waste originating outside New Jer-
sey bore a rational relation to the legitimate state purpose of envi-
ronmental protection. Therefore, the challenged statute survived 
the second phase of the consitutional review. 
C. The Balancing of Interests 
The third and final area for judicial concern consists of a balanc-
ing test.79 If the state has adopted a reasonable means for furthering 
a legitimate interest, the interest promoted by the statute and the 
72 68 N.J. at 475,348 A.2d at 517. 
73 [d. at 478, 348 A.2d at 519. 
" Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 127 N.J. 
Super. 160, 175,316 A.2d 711,719 (1974). 
" In the view of the superior court, any state law which has a greater effect on interstate 
commerce than on intrastate commerce would place an impermissible burden on interstate 
commerce. Therefore, the court concluded that the state law at issue was unconstitutional. 
See id. at 174-75, 316 A.2d at 718-19. 
" 127 N.J. Super. at 174-75, 316 A.2d at 718-19. 
77 See ENGDAHL, note 31 supra, at 285-86. 
1M Use of the Commerce Clause, note 31 supra, at 490-91; ENGDAHL, note 31 supra, at 286-
88. 
79 [d. 
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federal interest in a free interstate commerce are balanced against 
one another.so The courts must identify the more important interest 
in a particular case. SI If the courts identify the national interest as 
the more important interest, the statute unconstitutionally in-
fringes on Congress' authority to regulate commerce. 
In City of Philadelphia, the legitimate state interest is the protec-
tion of the environment, or, more specifically, the preservation of 
undeveloped land.sz In order to determine the constitutionality of 
the challenged statute, the courts must balance the state interest 
in preserving undeveloped land against the national interest in a 
free interstate commerce. As stated previously, however, the scales 
do not always start from a position of complete equilibrium. 
The United States Supreme Court has cited the need for 
uniformity among states' laws as an important consideration which 
tends to tip the balance in favor of the national interest.R3 At least 
in cases concerning the states' promotion of environmental inter-
ests, however, the mere potential of conflicting state legislation will 
not strengthen the national interest. In Huron Portland Cement Co. 
v. Detroit, the Court determined that challengers must demonstrate 
the actual existence of conflicting legislation in order to strengthen 
the national interest in the balancing process.84 
Demonstrating the actual existence of other states' laws which 
conflict with those of New Jersey would help tip the balance in favor 
of the national interest. 85 For example, in Bibb v. Navajo Freight 
"" Id. 
01 Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) . 
• 2 68 N.J. at 464-65,348 A.2d at 511-12. 
113 See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520 (1959) . 
.. 362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960) . 
.. Although an analysis concerned with the uniformity of states' laws, such as that con-
ducted by the United States Supreme Court in Bibb is similar to the analysis used in deter-
mining questions of preemption, there is an important difference. A preemption analysis asks 
whether a state statute conflicts with existing federal law or policy, or whether the subject 
matter is one amenable to regulation solely on the national level. See text at notes 23-29, 
supra. The analysis associated with the uniformity question, on the other hand, asks whether 
a state statute conflicts with the laws of other states so as to impermissibly burden interstate 
commerce. 
This distinction is apparent in Bibb. The Court found that Illinois was not preempted from 
enacting highway safety regulations. To the contrary, the Court "recognized the peculiarly 
local nature of this subject of safety, and ... upheld state statutes applicable alike to 
interstate and intrastate commerce .... " 359 U.S. at 523. Although there was no preemption 
problem, the Illinois statute conflicted with the laws of other states so as to impermissibly 
burden interstate commerce. Applying the balancing test, the Court concluded that "the 
heavy burden which the Illinois mudguard law places on the interstate movement of trucks 
and trailers seems to us to pass the permissible limits even for safety regulations." Id. at 530. 
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Lines, the disruption of commerce resulted from contradictory regu-
lations among the states.88 A truck could not possibly have been 
equipped to satisfy the conflicting laws of both Illinois and Arkan-
sas.87 Clearly in City of Philadelphia no actual conflict with other 
states' laws exists. Although hypothetical state statutes requiring 
that all waste must be exported to New Jersey would create a con-
flict, the absurdity of such laws is readily apparent. 
Another factor which favors the federal interest in the balancing 
process is the availability of reasonable and less burdensome alter-
natives for promoting the state interest.88 If the challenging party in 
City of Philadelphia proves the existence of a reasonable and less 
burdensome alternative means for furthering the state's purpose in 
preserving undeveloped land, the federal interest in the free flow of 
commerce would be strengthened. The question becomes what cri-
teria should be used to judge whether a proposed means in fact 
constitutes a reasonable alternative. The case law suggests that the 
proposed alternative should provide the same benefits as the chal-
lenged means, should not significantly increase the burden on the 
state, and should significantly lessen the burden on interstate com-
merce. 8B The challenger in Hackensack Meadowlands failed to es-
tablish the existence of a reasonable and less burdensome alterna-
tive means. Consequently, the New Jersey Supreme Court con-
cluded that the chosen method was "apparently the best avail-
able."Bo 
Having failed to identify the presence of either of the factors 
which strongly favor the national interest, reviewing state legisla-
tion under the commerce clause involves a simple balancing of the 
.. 359 U.S. 520 (1959). 
07 [d. at 527 . 
.. Great At!. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 372-73 (1976); Dean Milk Co. v. 
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-56 (1951). 
Although it is inappropriate for a court to examine alternative means as part of the means 
analysis, South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 190-91 (1938), 
the existence of reasonable alternatives is relevant to the balancing test by assisting in the 
determination of whether the burden placed on interstate commerce "can be justified in view 
of the character of the local interests and the available methods of protecting them." Dean 
Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951). The Court has stated that a state may not: 
"plainly discriminate against interstate commerce . . . even in the exercise of its unques-
tioned power to protect the health and safety of its people, if reasonable, nondiscriminatory 
alternatives adequate to conserve legitimate local interests, are available." [d . 
.. [d . 
.. 68 N.J. at 475,348 A.2d at 517. 
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respective state and federal interests. 91 Application of the balancing 
test raises serious problems, however. Implicit in the concept of 
balancing is the determination that one interest is greater, or more 
important, than another. To decide questions of relative value or 
importance, the courts must engage in a quantitative analysis. If the 
courts are to conduct any sort of meaningful comparison, the inter-
ests being compared must be amenable to some common scale of 
measurement. Once the value of the respective interests are mea-
sured on some common scale, the courts can make a quantitative 
judgment that one interest is of greater value than another. 
An example of the proper application of the balancing test is 
found in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 92 In order to protect the reputa-
tion of its farmers, Arizona law required that all cantaloupes grown 
in the state be packed in accordance with certain standards. The 
state interest furthered by the statute was the commercial interest 
of the farmers. The national concern was the commercial interest 
in a free interstate commerce. Since both the state and national 
interests were commercial, they were amenable to a common scale 
of measurement, namely, dollars. The Court therefore had a basis 
for comparing the relative value of the respective interests. The 
result of the balancing test was the conclusion that the national 
interest represented by the party challenging the statute out-
weighed the legitimate state interest. 93 Accordingly, the state stat-
ute was ruled unconstitutional as a violation of the commerce 
clause. 
Problems arise, however, when the state's interest cannot be mea-
sured in terms of dollars. For example, a challenger alleges that a 
state statute which furthers the safety of citizens unconstitutionally 
burdens interstate commerce. In order to determine the constitu-
tionality of the statute, a court must balance the state's interest in 
safety against the national interest in a free interstate commerce. 
The state's interest in safety cannot be measured in terms of dollars, 
nor may the national interest in a free interstate commerce be mea-
sured in terms of safety. Consequently, the courts lack any sort of 
standard by which to conduct a quantitative analysis. The balanc-
ing test, in such instances, becomes random picking and choosing 
between very different concerns. 
II See Use of the Commerce Clause, note 31 supra, at 490-91; ENGDAHL, note 31 supra, at 
286-88 . 
.. 397 U.S. 137 (1970) . 
.. [d. at 145-46. 
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IV. A NEW STANDARD PROPOSED 
The Supreme Court recognized the difficulties created by the 
balancing of commercial and noncommercial interests in 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen v. Chicago, 
Rock Island & Pacific Railroad. 94 A state statute purporting the 
legitimate state interest in safety established a minimum number 
of employees which could be employed on a train crew. A group of 
railroads alleged that the statute was an impermissible state inter-
ference with interstate commerce. The Court upheld the statute, 
and, in the process, refused to apply a balancing test as an element 
of the standard of review.9s The majority recognized its inability to 
conduct any sort of meaningful quantitative analysis with interests 
as different as safety and commerce. The opinion was critical of the 
district court for attempting to balance "financial losses . . . 
against the loss of lives and limbs of workers and people using the 
highways."9s The Supreme Court concluded that choosing between 
a noncommercial interest such as safety and the national interest 
in commerce was essentially a matter of "public policy" to be re-
solved "by the people acting through their elected representa-
tives."97 Thus, the Brotherhood opinion lends support to the conten-
tion that the approach to reviewing state laws under the commerce 
clause should be altered to take into account the difficulties which 
are created by the balancing of commercial and noncommercial 
interests. 
The premise that the Brotherhood reasoning should be applied to 
review the constitutionality of state environmental laws has re-
ceived some judicial support. American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor 
Control Commission98 involved a state court challenge to an Oregon 
statute which required that carbonated beverages and beer be sold 
in returnable bottles. In rejecting the allegation that the statute 
violated the commerce clause, the court refused to apply a balanc-
ing test. The Oregon court concluded that Brotherhood established 
"the inappropriateness of a weighing process in cases of non-
comparable benefit and injury .... "99 In reference to the subjective 
nature of balancing interests such as environmental protection and 
.. 393 U.S. 129 (1968). 
I. [d. at 143-44. 
H [d. at 140 . 
., [d. at 138 . 
.. 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973), appeal denied, 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1974). 
II 15 Or. App. at 630-31,517 P.2d at 697. 
738 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 5:721 
commerce, the court observed that the "process becomes political 
and is constitutionally assigned to the legislative branch as the de-
terminer of policy."loo Limiting the scope of its review to a purpose 
and a means analysis, the court concluded that the statute was a 
constitutionally valid exercise of state power. 101 
Soap and Detergent Association v. Clark 102 presents another ex-
ample of the application of the Brotherhood reasoning to review the 
constitutionality of an environmental law . The county ordinance at 
issue in Clark forbade the sale or use of phosphate detergents and 
established certain labeling requirements. The Association alleged 
that the ordinance placed an unreasonable burden on interstate 
commerce. Relying on Brotherhood, the federal district court stated 
that "the judicial power cannot be invoked to invalidate the judg-
ment of the County's citizens speaking through their elected repre-
sentatives as to the price society should pay to promote health and 
safety in their community."lo3 Consequently, the county ordinance 
was found constitutionally permissible. lo4 
The reasoning employed by the courts in American Can Co. v. 
Oregonl05 and Soap and Detergent Association v. Clark lo6 suggests 
the proper approach to reviewing the constitutionality of state envi-
ron mental legislation under the commerce clause. The state interest 
in environmental protection and the national interest in commerce 
are not amenable to a common scale of measurement. Conse-
quently, the courts lack any meaningful standards by which to con-
duct a quantitative analysis. The balancing test is reduced to a 
subjective value judgment. 
,00 [d. at 631, 517 P.2d at 698. 
'0' [d. at 644, 517 P.2d at 703. 
'02 330 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Fla. 1971). 
'03 [d. at 1222. 
'0' [d. at 1223. The district court did not completely dispense with a balancing test. Rather, 
it stated that the Brotherhood standard required that "the scales be strongly tipped in favor 
of the legislative pronouncement." [d. at 1222. Theoretically, the court may be allowing for 
a demonstration on the part of the challenging party of a compelling interest as justification 
for upholding a legislative pronouncement. However, the Supreme Court has not applied a 
compelling interest test to a party alleging the unconstitutionality of a legislative pronounce-
ment. As a practical matter, there does not appear to be any meaningful difference between 
the standard of review discussed in Soap and Detergent Association v. Clark, 330 F. Supp. 
1218 (S.D. Fla. 1971), and that discussed in the text. But see Proctor & Gamble Co. v. 
Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975). 
,05 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973), appeal denied, 15 Or. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 
(1974). 
, .. 330 F. Supp. 1218 (S.D. Fla. 1971). 
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This analysis does not require that the courts abdicate their role 
of adjudicating the constitutionality of state laws under the com-
merce clause. However, the constitutional review should be altered 
to reflect the uniqueness of the judicial role in commerce clause 
cases reviewing certain state laws. While the balancing test, sub-
ject to its shortcomings, may be a necessary component of consti-
tutional adjudication in some areas of the law, it is not necessary 
to the resolution of all state commerce clause cases. Congress, not 
the judiciary, is the final authority for determining the appropriate 
scope of state regulation.107 Moreover, the Congress is better 
equipped than the courts to balance two interests not amenable to 
a common scale of measurement. lOS Unlike the judiciary, Congress 
does not have to narrow its deliberations to a particular fact situa-
tion. Rather, Congress may consider all the relevant facts and then 
issue whatever policy judgment appears most reasonable. loD Thus, 
it is inappropriate and unnecessary for the courts to embark upon 
a standardless balancing of very different interests. 
Courts should continue to inquire whether a state has chosen a 
legitimate state purpose and a reasonable means for furthering that 
purpose. Also, if the state interest is commercial in nature, the 
courts should continue to apply a balancing test. Similarly, if the 
state interest is not commercial in nature, and either the disruption 
of commerce results from a lack of uniformity among the laws of 
various states, or there exists a reasonable and less burdensome 
alternative means, the courts should continue to apply a balancing 
test and ordinarily find in favor of the strengthened federal interest. 
However, if the state interest is not commercial and the factors 
which favor the federal interest in the balancing process are not 
present, the balancing test becomes unnecessary. Foregoing the 
balancing test would permit the courts to decide the constitution-
ality of state laws without having to make subjective policy judg-
ments. If, as a policy matter, Congress should believe that a state 
law sustained by the courts imposed an excessive burden on inter-
state commerce, Congress would retain the final authority to pre-
empt the offensive state provision. l1O 
'07 See Use of the Commerce Clause, note 31 supra, at 493. 
, .. In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962), the Court stated that "the lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving ... " a dispute is one indication that 
the dispute may best be resolved by the political branches of government. 
,01 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1939). 
II. See Use of the Commerce Clause, note 31 supra, at 493. 
------- -
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The subjective nature of balancing interests such as environmen-
tal protection and commerce is evident in Hackensack 
Meadowlands. The New Jersey Supreme Court balanced the respec-
tive interests and concluded that the state interest was the greater 
of the two. III On the other hand, the superior court, confronted with 
precisely the same fact situation, conducted a balancing test under 
the guise of a means analysis and concluded that the national inter-
est was the greater .112 
In light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in 
Brotherhood, the better approach to reviewing the constitutionality 
of the state statute at issue in City of Philadelphia and state envi-
ronmentallaws in general would be to dispense with the balancing 
test altogether. By applying the Brotherhood reasoning, the subjec-
tive policy judgments rendered by the New Jersey courts could be 
avoided. Therefore, without applying the balancing test, the state 
law should be sustained as a constitutionally permissible exercise of 
state power. 
V. CONCLUSION 
If the New Jersey Supreme Court rules that the Waste Control 
Act ll3 has not been preempted by the Resource Recovery and Con-
servation Act,114 the constitutional issues presented by City of 
Philadelphia may again be before the United States Supreme 
Court. City of Philadelphia would present the Court with the oppor-
tunity to state explicitly that the Brotherhood reasoning is to be 
applied in reviewing the constitutionality of state environmental 
laws under the commerce clause. A holding to this effect by the 
Court could have a significant influence on the future of state envi-
ronmental regulation. The subjective balancing test permits the 
courts to exercise a judicial veto of any environmental regulation 
which affects commerce. Uncertainty pervades the constitutional 
adjudication. Consequently, states are unable to determine the 
scope of their own authority to enact environmental laws. The 
Brotherhood reasoning substitutes principled analysis for subjective 
III Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 68 N.J. 
451, 348 A.2d 505 (1975). 
112 Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Auth., 127 N.J. 
Super. 160, 316 A.2d 711 (1974). 
113 See note 1, supra. 
114 Resource Recovery and Conservation Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901 et seq. (1976). 
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determinations. Free from unwarranted and unpredictable judicial 
interference, the states would have greater latitude in formulating 
policies designed to preserve and protect a state's legitimate interest 
in its environment. Accordingly, adoption ofthe Brotherhood analy-
sis for reviewing the constitutionality of state environmental laws 
may prove to be a catalyst for increased state activity directed to-
wards the protection of the environment. 
